Suchergebnisse

Many years ago Robert Dahl (1957) argued that the courts are rarely out of alignment with the dominant national political coalition and more recent scholarship has built on this argument. However, despite this, it is still a prevalent belief that courts protect the minority against the power of the majority. This article analyzes these views by examining the influence of the national coalition and courts on tax policy. The article shows that from 1994 through 2000 a shift to more low-income audits results from political and judicial influence on the agency. The dominant national political coalition, the Tax Court, and to a lesser extent the District Courts, are major players in setting and determining agency policy. This confirms what Dahl noted years ago, namely that the courts are rarely out of alignment with the dominant national political coalition, and actually enforce the policy preferences of the dominant political coalition.

Many years ago Robert Dahl (1957) argued that the courts are rarely out of alignment with the dominant national political coalition and more recent scholarship has built on this argument. However, despite this, it is still a prevalent belief that courts protect the minority against the power of the majority. This article analyzes these views by examining the influence of the national coalition and courts on tax policy. The article shows that from 1994 through 2000 a shift to more low-income audits results from political and judicial influence on the agency. The dominant national political coalition, the Tax Court, and to a lesser extent the District Courts, are major players in setting and determining agency policy. This confirms what Dahl noted years ago, namely that the courts are rarely out of alignment with the dominant national political coalition, and actually enforce the policy preferences of the dominant political coalition. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2008.]

Considerable scholarly attention has been paid to litigation and its influence on social and bureaucratic policy. One area of research has focused on interest group litigation. Another area of scholarship has shown that Congress encourages individual use of the courts to monitor and control bureaucratic behavior. In several areas of law, litigants have a choice of forum by deliberate legislative design, which is sometimes derided as "forum shopping." Little attention has been paid to the dominant national political coalition's ability to encourage forum shopping through legislation and the appointment process. One area of law that the coalition can encourage forum shopping is in challenging tax audits. It can do so through implict legislative signals and the appointment process to influence litigants to sue the Internal Revenue Service in the forum that offers the litigant the greatest chance of success. Given the prominent role of courts in setting and determining policy and given the particular prominence of taxes and tax policy over the past three decades, whether and where tax litigants choose to sue is critically important to understanding the dynamics of both tax policy and tax enforcement, as well as public policy creation and change. To demonstrate the influence of political forces on tax forum choice, I compare tax and district court filings from 1994 through to 2000. I find that as the Tax Court and national political coalition become more conservative, more taxpayers sue in the Tax Court and this "forum shopping" choice is supported by the national political coalition.

Many view courts as institutions that allow individual litigants to achieve equity, or fairness, when the litigant has a dispute with a branch of government. However, many also argue that this fairness comes at the expense of efficiency and democratic control, particularly when individuals sue government agencies. Perhaps no agency exemplifies the competing concerns of equity, efficiency, and policy controlas does the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Taxpayer suits against the IRS seek individual fairness but at the expense of IRS efficiency and policy control. However, in using a two-stage least squares analysis of court verdicts, IRS audits, and litigation rates, I find that courts and litigants can achieve both fairness and IRS efficiency. Courts help the tax system function, by signaling to the IRS that their audit policy is incorrect and inefficient. Thus, courts aid both fairness and efficiency.

Objectives. Although scholars have recognized that the wealth and power of litigants has substantial influence on litigation outcomes, there has been less recognition of the ability of the wealthy to sway agency policy through litigation. I argue that the wealthy, through lawsuits and the outcomes from the litigation, influence Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audits of the wealthy and the less affluent. Methods. I examine IRS state audit rates and use ordinary least squares regression with panel corrected standard errors. Results. I show that wealthy litigants can influence the IRS to decrease audits of the wealthy and increase audits of the less affluent. Conclusions. The wealthy appear to have the ability to influence IRS policy through lawsuits. Litigation can influence agency policy.

Objectives. Although scholars have recognized that the wealth & power of litigants has substantial influence on litigation outcomes, there has been less recognition of the ability of the wealthy to sway agency policy through litigation. I argue that the wealthy, through lawsuits & the outcomes from the litigation, influence Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audits of the wealthy & the less affluent. Methods. I examine IRS state audit rates & use ordinary least squares regression with panel corrected standard errors. Results. I show that wealthy litigants can influence the IRS to decrease audits of the wealthy & increase audits of the less affluent. Conclusions. The wealthy appear to have the ability to influence IRS policy through lawsuits. Litigation can influence agency policy. 2 Tables, 34 References. Adapted from the source document.